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Despite many weaknesses, passwords are still mainly used, 
and will continue to be used in the near future, for the user 
authentication process. Passwords remain one of the 
important pillars of the protection structure even though they 
are not sufficiently robust against well-designed attacks. 
Thus, users need to select and protect robust passwords. The 
consequences of password disclosure to adversaries might 
have disastrous results, which in turn would increase the 
need to focus extensively on security factors in order to 
strengthen and protect passwords. Humans usually create far 
from random passwords that are vulnerable to attack. One 
important factor in estimating the impact of attacks and the 
strength of created passwords is to understand the ability of 
attackers to deduce passwords. Unfortunately, many efforts 
at strength estimation have failed. The main reason for this 
failure is that these efforts specifically focus on protection 
against Brute Force attacks. Other attempts have tried to 
design attacks against user passwords in order to test their 
strength and to accordingly improve them. This idea is 
expensive and insufficient to uncover or perhaps to identify 
professionally designed attacks. Another technique is to 
assign robust randomly generated passwords which could 
provide higher security. Assigning passwords by systems 
ensures that the users do not reuse the same passwords for 
different applications. On the other hand, it is challenging 
for users to remember such passwords. This has eventually 
led to the idea of using software management tools 
specifically designed for storing user passwords; however, 
the single point of failure will be the main drawback of such 
a method. Since password are remain the popular method for 
authentication, and will continue to be in the future, 
password security problems have become a global issue. 
Thus, designing robust, secure, and efficient password 
creation techniques needs to be urgently undertaken and with 
the utmost care. This paper briefly summarizes the most 
common attacks against passwords as well as some related 
works that have been conducted in the field of security and 
usability of passwords. 
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Although they have many weaknesses and are targeted by attacks, 




familiarity and ease of implementation. Moreover, users do not 
need to carry them around on their person [3]. The explosive 
increase in daily use applications that require authentication 
through passwords has increased the number of passwords in use 
for almost everyone. This requires remembering a number of 
related passwords that would burden some people and  also leads 
users to opt for weak passwords, which are easy to remember and 
can be reused for different applications. 
 
Although considerable research has been conducted into 
developing passwords, many users still prefer to use passwords that 
can be easily remembered, which in turn are easily broken by 
attacks. Many users believe that adding special characters, such as 
“!”, to the end of the password, will enhance its security and make 
it more difficult to spell and predict. However, in an actual attack 
scenario, this is very predictable. Others suppose that using “non-
released special data”, such as a name, birthday, or wedding date, 
will be secure, but do not consider that automated guessing attacks 
take into account common names and events. Generally, many 
users anticipate that using arbitrary mixed upper and lower case 
characters reduces the probability of attacks, whereas many try to 
include some other ways, such as combining unrelated words or 
developing unique phrases that in turn produce strong passwords 
[4]. Many users choose to assign weak passwords for low value 
accounts as a result of analyzing the costs and benefits of such 
accounts, making them more prone to attacks. Those users often 
think about the earned value of using the passwords [5]. Moreover, 
misconceptions about what makes a password robust overshadows 
these users so that many of them try to achieve security parameters 
that meet their desired security levels. 
 
Many attempts have been made to deal with password attacks 
resulting from users' disregard or lack of interest in creating strong 
passwords [6].  In a study by Ur et al. [4], some participants used 
different methods to choose their passwords, including selecting  
words and phrases such as a year or an emoticon. For low security 
accounts, they tended to choose names of places that they had 
visited while, for high security accounts, highly non-predictable 
words were the preference. These users often chose passwords 
based on personal topics. Other methods that were used include 
passwords from web pages, such as the name and purpose of the 
website.  Some participants in the study included capital letters and 
punctuation while others chose to include digits and symbols 
expecting their passwords to be sufficiently strong [4]. As a result, 
there is a real need to develop an easy method of creating passwords 
with enhanced strength. Strength of password means how much it 
will cost attackers (in terms of time, effort and money) to reach their 
goal:  in other words, the number of attempts needed by adversaries 
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mechanism for generating passwords with enough strength, a study 
of the attack properties and the vulnerabilities of currently used 
techniques needs to be initially performed.  
 
The following three subsections of the paper will focus on: 1.1) 
Password authentication approaches; 1.2) Common attacks on 
passwords; and 1.3) Analysis of password strength factors. 
 
1.1 Password Authentication Approaches  
There are various types of password attacks, the number of which 
is dramatically increasing along with an increase in 
distributed communication networks and applications. Broken 
passwords can be used by criminals to breach an entire system or 
by security analysts for security analysis purposes. Hence, users 
should be aware of probable password attacks so that they will be 
able to look for alternative methods of selecting robust passwords 
and also protect their chosen ones. Passwords are mainly used for 
authentication purposes in different ways. The most common 
authentication approaches are:  
 
o Conventional Password Scheme: This type is the classical 
method of password authentication that works by checking the 
entered password and username in a stored file inside the 
system. It is a simple method but the most vulnerable to 
attacks.  
o Typing Dynamics: This method, which basically depends on 
pressed keys and their timing, analyzes the way that the user 
enters a password. It stores all the key names, key pressing and 
releasing times which could be used to manipulate ways to 
deduce passwords. While it is effective against shoulder 
surfing, the main drawback of this method is the refusal rate 
as a result of the user’s typing speed, which can be affected by 
the user mode. 
o Graphical Passwords: This method works by selecting a 
manner or drawing of an object, selecting graphical objects in 
a specific order, or connecting some objects in a pre-chosen 
manner in a graphical user interface. Although this method 
reduces the probability of shoulder surfing attacks, it needs 
more processing time than other techniques. 
o Biometrics: This type is basically built on the image 
processing technique. It works by comparing the selected 
image (password) with that previously stored. It can be 
implemented with many techniques, such as biometrics of 
signature verification, face recognition, or fingerprints. This 
method could avoid many types of attacks, but is expensive. 
 
1.2 Common attacks on passwords 
1. Brute Force Attack: This is the most widely popular 
attack since it does not need prior knowledge of which 
password strategy has been used to create the password. 
It tries all possible consecutive values of the targeted 
password in order to break it. This method is generally 
used for passwords that are stored in an encrypted 
manner. Some operating systems store their passwords in 
an encrypted file inside the operating system.  If this file 
is stolen, the attacker may apply the Burst Force method 
to break the saved passwords. The hash values of the 
passwords are usually stored in the system. This method 
is easy to implement but may take a long time to achieve 
the targeted passwords. For example, by this method, 
breaking a password of four characters needs 264 =
 456976 combinations, if all four characters are in lower 
or upper case. This means that this method is effective 
for small passwords. This method can also be employed 
by advanced attackers by using numerous forms of 
hybrid attacks such as combining dictionary attacks (see 
below) with Brute Force attacks [8]. Additionally, this 
type of attack is effective against weak selections, 
especially classical passwords. 
2. Dictionary Attack: This method, first proposed in 1979 
by Morris and Thompson, can be partially considered as 
faster than the Brute Force method. Starting from the 
principle that many users adopt related information, such 
as birthdays, names, or pet's names, as their passwords, 
this method tries to match the password with words that 
are frequently used on a daily basis and are collected in a 
dictionary.  Most of the words in the dictionary are 
collected according to the most widely used vocabulary 
with the probability that those words are used as 
passwords. The main limitation of this method is that the 
password that is being searched might not be included in 
the dictionary. Modern dictionary attacks combine 
wordlists, which usually contain natural language 
dictionaries in addition to stolen passwords, and string 
transformations that will be used to modify wordlist 
entries to create additional guesses. This transformation 
is known as mangling rules, while this type of attack is 
referred to as a Mangled wordlist attack [3]. 
3. Video Recording Attack: As the name implies, the attack 
is implemented by recording the user’s password entry 
more than one time in order to analyze the entered 
passwords. Most often regarded as the easiest way to 
obtain access to a desired password, this method does not 
need much time or calculation. 
4. Malware attack: This is a software-based attack that 
gains access to the target device without the user’s 
knowledge.  It can disrupt access to private information, 
or harm the computer system. 
5. Key Loggers: This is a type of malware attack that works 
by installing a software in the user’s system. The Key 
Logger software is installed either directly by the attacker 
or by deceiving the user to download a particular script. 
This software in turn monitors all the user’s activities.  
The mission of this program is to record all pressed keys 
and send the results to the attacker. This attack, which 
results in discovering the password that can be later used 
to access the targeted system, is effective against 
conventional password methods. 
6. Shoulder Surfing: Also known as spying, this type of 
attack tries to gain any knowledge that might lead to 
obtaining the password by direct observation or by using 
external recording devices [6]. The attacker can observe 
the password with different methods, such as hearing the 
number of keys that the user has pressed and then trying 
to guess the pressed keys, relying on what has been 
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the attacker tries to use any applicable way to observe any 
information that will lead to obtaining the password. This 
method is effective versus conventionally chosen 
passwords. 
7. Phishing Attack: This is a type of attack where the user 
is attracted to make a registration profile on a fraudulent 
website so that the entered data will be used later by 
unauthorized software to capture any actions by the user. 
These actions can then be analyzed to find the login 
credentials of that particular user [9]. This attack is 
successful with classical passwords. 
8. Reply Attack: This is also known as playback or 
reflection attack, which is actually a network attack. In 
this type of attack, the attacker eavesdrops on the 
connection between the sender and the receiver and tries 
to capture the authentication data. The attacker will then 
use the authentication information as “proof of identity” 
to establish a future connection with the receiver. 
9. Probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG):  A type of 
guessing attack proposed by Weir et al. in 2009,  this is 
based on the realization of the similar structure that 
passwords often follow [7]; as such, it can accurately 
model password distribution. It has been used 
specifically with training data sets of password 
infractions to model passwords, followed by guess 
generating. PCFG allocates probabilities to the structure 
of the password and the string components of that 
password. The main use of PCFG is to parse or generate 
sentences [10]. PCFG has been used by many research 
studies to compute “guess ability” [3]. As an example, 
the structure of string laba123 is four letters and three 
digits while the component strings “123” will be added 
to a list of three digit strings that has been created.  
10. Markov models: The Markov model, a tool used for 
password strength estimation, is suitable for estimating 
password probabilities and better than probabilistic 
context-free grammars, as concluded by a recent work 
[9]. It has also been found that the Markov model with a 
particular configuration was more efficient than other 
methods at password guessing for some datasets of 
leaked passwords [3]. 
 
1.3 Analyzing Password-Strength Meters  
Traditionally, a simple evaluation method to test the strength of a 
password can be achieved by measuring the number of special 
characters, such as symbols, digits, and lower and uppercase 
characters that the password includes. This approach is ineffective 
for current attacks. Recent studies suggest that a way to evaluate 
password strength is by the number of tries an attacker needs to 
determine the password. Other studies evaluate password strength 
against a Brute Force attack. However, most of the suggested 
password strength models were built on the basis of heuristic 
approaches which  most likely do not ensure password resistance 
against guessing attacks [7]. Amico and Filippone in [7] conducted 
a first study of password strength which provided a reliable 
estimation of the rate of success of recent modern and costly attack 
techniques. This study shows that it is possible to evaluate a 
password by guessing attempts. This leads to the conclusion that 
any attacker must be forced to spend as much time as possible and 
that a balance of security versus usability should be taken into 
account when analyzing password strength. Moreover, the number 
of guessing attempts on passwords has been correlated against 
various types of attacks. Amico and Filippone propose a new 
approach to calculate the number of attempts that an attacker needs 
to achieve a required password. This method can be applied to 
various sets of probabilistic models with few resources. The 
evaluation of password strength has been tested against a large 
number of attacks including those that are expected to be very 
expensive to handle along with available simulated guessing 
methods. Carnavalet and Mannan in [11] show that providing users 
with feedback about the strength of their chosen passwords 
influences their choice in providing better passwords. It is 
important to indicate strength meters that should enhance the 
strength of the chosen passwords at the time of creation. 
 
Many meters are usually employed by software evaluation tools 
(checkers) to assess a password’s strength at the time of creation 
when the user will accordingly receive feedback on its strength. 
This in turn should encourage the user to choose better passwords. 
The common evaluation meters adopted by many applications are: 
 Charset and length requirements: These classify the 
chosen password by many factors, such as: setting a 
minimum length; enforcing a maximum length; requiring 
use of certain character sets; or disallowing usage of 
some characters with others [11]. 
 Strength scales and labels: Scaling standards vary 
among different checkers. The strength of passwords can 
be scaled, for example, as secure, short, fair, weak, or not 
secure. These scales differ from one software to another 
[11].  
 User information: User specific information, such as 
name, email address, and contextual information, are 
considered as a weak password. 
 
2. Related Work 
The following four subsections of the paper summarize four related 
works that attempt to improve the security and usability factors of 
passwords: 2.1) Estimating strength of the password; 2.2) 
Improving memorability of randomly generated passwords; 2.3) 
Password managers; and 2.4) Graphical password schemes. 
 
2.1 Estimating Strength of Passwords 
The first study of this technique was in 1979 by Morris and 
Thompson, who mention that it is possible to estimate a large 
number of passwords that have been used in the UNIX system by 
Dictionary and Brute Force attacks [7]. This was a proactive action 
used to estimate the strength of the suggested (chosen) passwords 
to avoid or reduce the occurrence of attacks. Most password 
checkers use multiple rules to evaluate the strength of passwords 
and the generality of these rules is simple. Actually, using such 
weak rules has proven to be an unreliable indicator for evaluating 
password strength. Another password classification idea involves 
reducing the password’s existence in databases. Eventually, the 
Markov model was produced as a secure password predictor [9]. It 
has been found that analyzing a large set of passwords is often a 
challenge for the used algorithm; however, achieving the required 
result depends on the algorithm’s configuration. Oftentimes, 
professionals’ rules of password estimation can be approximated 
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on only one guessing algorithm for password cracking is a risk that 
should be taken into consideration [3]. Dürmuth et al. in [9] 
produced a password guesser (OMEN) based on the Markov model, 
which performs better than other available password guessers. This 
model is able to estimate more than 80 % of attempted passwords, 
indicating that this method can be described as a preventive 
measure [9].  
Amico and Filippone [7] propose an easier and newer approach to 
estimating the needed number of guesses by using modern attacks. 
They provide theorems that show the correctness and 
approximation of this method. They also claimed that the number 
of password guesses correlates against different attacks. 
Accordingly, it is suggested that testing passwords against different 
attacks would produce higher strength value. 
 
2.2 Improving Memorability of Randomly 
Generated Passwords 
Another method used to generate strong passwords against 
guessing attacks is the use of a randomly generated password.  This 
method generates passwords by taking pseudorandom numbers as 
input and creates random passwords by applying some operations. 
However, while the randomly generated passwords can be complex 
and strong against some attacks, they are difficult to remember.  
In order to enhance password memorability, Huh et al. in [8] 
propose a technique for replacing some of the characters chosen by 
users in randomly generated passwords. The length of generated 
passwords in this study is eight characters, which is the common 
standard. The main focus of this research compares the usability 
and security among users’ chosen passwords and randomly 
generated passwords with different policies: policy 1(1-change) to 
policy 4 (4-changes). The study has been designed according to the 
following three hypotheses:  
 Memorability increases as the number of replacement 
characters increases. 
 Security decreases by increasing the allowed number of 
replaced characters. 
 There is no statistical evidence regarding the differences 
between complexity and memorability related to 
passwords chosen by users. This policy produces 
superior security rather than complexity. 
 
The number of character replacements is defined by each policy (0-
change to 4-changes). For evaluation purposes, the security and 
usability of this method have been studied online, on a large scale.  
In the initial stage of this study, 5,412 participants took part, 
whereas 3,839 participants completed the second stage for five 
weeks. It was clear that policies 3-changes and 4-changes 
outperformed policy 0 in memorability while the cracked 
percentage was 0% in 0-change, 1.21% in 3-changes, and 5.82% in 
4-changes. There was no significant memorability difference 
between policies 3 and 4 and the estimated entropy was lower than 
0 policy. In memorability, policies of 3 and 4 character 
replacements surpassed the original randomly generated passwords 
by 11% to 13%, whereas the cracked password percentage slightly 
increased. When compared with the complexity of user generated 
passwords, policy 4-changes did not demonstrate any progress in 
memorability. Finally, lab results show that the surpass scheme, 
proposed in [8], outperformed user generated password policy in 
security with 21% fewer cracked passwords [8], but did not provide 
any evidence of proportional improvement between memorability 
and the number of replaced characters. 
 
2.3 Password Manager 
As the number of text passwords needed by users increases, the 
ability to choose and remember all of them becomes more difficult, 
particularly in web applications. Furthermore, text passwords are 
still preferred by many users since they are inexpensive and easy, 
and offer a simple authentication approach that avoids privacy 
breaches.  
 
One proposed solution to decrease the difficulties related to text 
passwords is the use of a password manager (PM), which is one of 
the simplest methods of managing passwords without memorizing 
or saving them in written form. Password manager software is a 
database that stores all user passwords and usernames. Access to 
the database is restricted by using a username and password. Thus, 
the user only needs to remember a robust master password and the 
user name. By using a password manager, the user can choose a 
strong password for each web application, without the need to 
remember them [12]. For the application, the password manager re-
generates the required stored (encrypted) password and sends 
(autofill) it to the application on behalf of the user. 
 
Automatic autofill populates the form that contains the fields of 
username and password at the time of loading the login page 
without any user interaction, such as PMs in Chrome, Firefox, 
Safari, and LastPass.  Manual autofill needs some user interaction 
prior to the autofill process, such as username typing, or button 
pressing, such as PMs in Keeper and KeePass [13]. Some password 
managers impose manual interaction in particular cases. 
 
The following two subsections focus on: 2.3.1) Attacks on 
password managers and 2.3.2) Improving password managers. 
2.3.1 Attacks on Password Managers 
 Sweep attacks: Such attacks steal passwords from 
multiple sites at a time. This is accomplished by 
enforcing the user’s browser to visit a vulnerable 
malicious site without the users’ knowledge, then 
applying (injecting) JavaScript code into the site’s 
webpage. This code exfiltrates passwords and sends them 
to an attacker [13]. 
 Injection Techniques: Logging into a page within the 
same origin domain is not enough since most PMs link 
the preserved passwords with domains while ignoring the 
paths of the login pages.  In this situation, an attacker can 
insert a fraudulent login form in the same domain to any 
page and then begin a password extraction attack in this 
page [13]. 
 Password Exfiltration: Gaining access to password 
fields, then sending them to a self-controlled server. This 
can be achieved in two ways: 
o Stealth: Loading an attacker remote-controlled page 
in a hidden iFrame, which in turn passes the 
password as a parameter to the attackers’ page [13]. 
o Action: Modifying the action properties of the login 
form to submit credential data to the attacker’s self-
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2.3.2 Improving Password Managers 
 Forcing User Interaction  
In order to prevent sweep attacks, PMs should always require user 
interaction before auto-filling the form. This interaction can be 
achieved by, for example, typing the username or clicking a button. 
In addition, the domain name should be shown to the user before 
the auto-filling process takes place [13]. 
 Secure Filling  
Regardless of the filled password submission approach, there is no 
supported method to prevent stealing passwords after filling the 
login form with the password. The filled password can be read by 
JavaScript code and submitted to an attacker controlled page. Silver 
et al. [13] suggested a defensive approach to this problem as 
follows: 
 At the time of creation, the password manager stores the 
username and password along with any providable 
information (actions). 
 Once the autofill is complete, the password fields turn 
into unreadable state, preventing stealth exfiltration, by 
JavaScript code (autofill is in progress). If any change 
occurs in the password and username fields, the autofill 
is voided and password fields are cleared, meaning that 
they can be read one more time by JavaScript. 
 Immediately after the delivery of the autofill, the form’s 
action is compared with the first saved action at the 
password initiation time. If matched, the action has not 
been changed by any malicious site. The form will then 
be allowed for normal submission. If not, the password 
fields will be erased and the submission will fail. 
 
2.4 Graphical Password Schemes 
Because text passwords suffer from security and usability 
drawbacks, graphical passwords have been proposed since the end 
of the twentieth century for the purpose of improving password 
usability and memorability.  
In general, graphical passwords are categorized according to 
memorability and into three categories: recall (remembering 
without cueing); cued recall (providing an external cue); and 
recognition (memorizing an image portfolio) [1].  
Many studies have been conducted into the following three aspects 
of graphical passwords: memorability, security, and recall based 
systems. In fact, these three schemes are vulnerable to attack. 
Recall based schemes are vulnerable to Malware attacks, cued 
recall schemes are vulnerable to Shoulder Surfing and Malware 
attacks, while recognition based schemes are resistant to Phishing 
attacks but are susceptible to Shoulder surfing.  In conclusion, 
graphical passwords are generally more vulnerable to Shoulder 
Surfing attacks than text passwords [1], whereas advanced 
Malware protection techniques are required for graphical 
passwords. Taking into account the most serious attacks, it is 
difficult to determine if text passwords are more vulnerable than 
graphical passwords. Nonetheless, graphical passwords remain 
practical, since they provide greater usability than text passwords. 
 
3. Discussion & Future Directions 
The more advanced attacks are always designed by highly 
professional attackers. However, the way to guessing the nature of 
any new approaches mostly depends on understanding traditionally 
discovered attack schemes. Moreover, simulating all available 
guessing attack algorithms is impractical and expensive. Thus, 
estimating the strength of any password might help to slightly 
improve password strength, but this is expensive and will not be 
enough to uncover professionally designed attack techniques. 
 
In the technique proposed by Huh et al. [8] to improve the 
memorability of randomly generated passwords, there is no 
significant memorability difference between policies 3 and 4. The 
estimated entropy shows that it is lower than 0 policy. In the case 
of memorability, policies of 3 and 4 that have undergone character 
replacements surpassed the original randomly generated passwords 
by 11% to 13%, whereas the cracked password percentage is 
slightly increased, which will weaken the strength factor of the 
random number.  
 
Password Manager is a better approach then either method of 
estimating the strength of passwords or improving the 
memorability of randomly generated passwords. The improvement 
that has been discussed in paper [10] will help protect passwords. 
Frequent updating of password managers is necessary in order to 
shield against newly designed attack approaches and must be 
supported by an application provider to achieve better security. 
Even when password strength is reasonable, a low strength flag 
could urge the user to create a much stronger password.  
 
The graphical password technique can be one of the better ways to 
support password strength. Graphical password schemes can be 
enhanced by using an advanced approach with more parts for the 
graphical password space, including more items, which would be 
much stronger against attacks. On the other hand, this technique 
needs higher processing time than regular methods and also brings 
a higher implementation cost. 
 
In order to minimize losses as much as possible against password 
attacks, a dynamic password scheme, which periodically changes 
the user’s password, could be implemented in an effort to decrease 
attacks. Whatever time the user enters the system, she/he will be 
given a new choice of updating the password for the next entry. 
This idea, which might be a burden for users to follow, will provide 
more protection against attacks. Finally, the way forward depends 
on the balance of security, usability, and data value and how they 
are measured by users. 
 
Further research should focus on measuring the password strength 
achieved by replacing a specific number of known characters in a 
twelve digit randomly generated password by a pseudorandom 
generator source such as a cryptographically secure pseudo-
random number generator (CSPRNG). 
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